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The United Nations has had a central place in Irish foreign policy from the state’s 
accession in 1955.  Both political discourse and public opinion polls indicate 
widespread support for the organisation as a source of international legitimacy and 
as the appropriate forum to make major decisions regarding peace and security; 
international human rights; and development.  The EU has an equally central role in 
Ireland’s economic and social development in the last three decades, and while there 
is no significant opposition to EU membership, recent referenda on the EU Treaties 
of Nice and Lisbon were defeated on the first attempts, highlighting opposition to 
some aspects of recent EU integration processes.  
 
This chapter begins with a brief examination of the first White Paper on foreign policy 
in the history of the state, published in 1996, as a means of looking at some of the 
long running context for Irish Foreign policy priorities.1  It then explores Ireland’s 
recent relationship with the EU focusing on the referenda on the Lisbon Treaty and 
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 Government of Ireland.  White Paper on Foreign Policy: Challenges And Opportunities 
Abroad. Dublin: Government Publications, 1996.   
http://www.dfa.ie/information/publications/whitepaper/default.asp , para 5.8.   
The continued relevance of these four areas is indicated by a speech by the Taoiseach [prime 
minister] , 14 Sept 2005. http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/index.asp?locID=200&docID=2157.   
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finishes with an analysis of Ireland’s engagement with the United Nations, including 
its last period on the security council in 2001-2.     
 
 
Tensions in Irish Foreign policy 
In the 1996 Irish Government White Paper on Foreign Policy the UN is described as 
‘a cornerstone of Irish foreign policy’ and support for the UN and its goals is 
expressed in the context of the values that underlie Ireland’s foreign policy.  The 
White Paper argued that these goals are not merely ethical aspirations but are 
essential to the self interest of small states, asserting that: 
It is precisely because Ireland is small and hugely dependent on external 
trade for its well-being that we need an active foreign policy. … We depend 
for our survival on a regulated international environment in which the rights 
and interests of even the smallest are guaranteed and protected. 
Recent debates on Irish Foreign Policy have highlighted the potential between these 
aspirations and Irish economic interests, which are based on a dependence on US 
based foreign direct investment and EU economic integration.  Former Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Brian Cowen argued against an analysis of foreign policy on the basis 
of values versus interests, arguing that ‘a multilateral rules-based international order 
is in our national interest.’; it is clear that the day to day elaboration of these interests 
has involved tensions, generating public discourse about the direction of Irish policy 
in both the UN and the EU.  
 
 
Ireland and the European Union 
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The European Union is popular in Ireland and opinion polls consistently show that a 
clear majority of the public believe that EU membership has been a positive 
experience for the country.  For some Irish nationalists European integration has 
been a liberating process, ending the post colonial economic and political 
dependence on Britain.  For others – on the more radical left wing of Irish politics, the 
nature of EU integration (but no longer the EU itself) has been criticised for being 
over centralised, dominated by neo-liberal economics and focused on building a 
European superpower. 
 
The defeat of the first Nice referendum in 2001, was a shock to the political 
establishment, but following the success of a second Nice referendum the following 
year, the significance of initial defeat was to some extent minimised – and explained 
as being the result of a poor government information campaign (and the Government 
campaign was undoubtedly poor).  The defeat of the subsequent Treaty of Lisbon, by 
a ‘no’ vote of 53.4%, on a relatively high turnout for a referendum, of 53.1%, was 
more of a shock to the political system and led to a more systematic and detailed 
analysis of voter concerns.   
 
Analyses of public opinion carried out on behalf of the Irish Department of Foreign 
Affairs after the first (defeated) Lisbon Treaty referendum, in an effort to clarify voter 
concerns, highlighted a number of significant facts.2  Opposition to the Treaty was 
strongest amongst 25-34 year olds (59%), lower income groups (66%) and women 
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 All following references to See Millward Brown / IMC, Post Lisbon Treaty Referendum  
Research Findings (2008). 
http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/Publications/Post%20Lisbon%20Treaty%20Referendu
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and Richard Sinnott, Johan A. Elkink, Kevin O’Rourke and James McBride Attitudes and 
Behaviour in the Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon, 2009. 
http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/ucd%20geary%20institute%20report.pdf 
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(56%).  Amongst the two dominant conservative parties, 63% of the supporters of the 
governing Fianna Fáil party supporters voted yes but only 52% of the traditionally 
more pro-EU Fine Gael (opposition) party.  61% of Labour Party supporters and 53% 
of Green Party supporters voted no – despite the fact that their party leaderships 
campaigned for a yes vote. 
Not understanding the Treaty was by far the most common spontaneous reason 
given for voting ‘no’.  In fact 23% of yes voters and 53% of no voters either said that 
they ‘did not know’ or were only ‘vaguely aware’ of what the Treaty was about, and 
over 40% of no voters spontaneously mentioned this when asked why they voted no.  
Other more substantive reasons for voting no included loss of independence (18%) 
and loss of neutrality / military issues (8%) and loss of an automatic Commissioner 
(4%).  Supporters of the Treaty tended to mention the importance of the EU in quite a 
general way as the main reason for voting yes.  When voters were directly asked 
about specific issues, which had featured strongly in the referendum, 82% of no 
voters (compared to 71% of yes voters) said military neutrality was important / very 
important in determining how they voted; 71% of No voters  said the loss of a 
commissioner was important and 86% of no voters cited ‘workers rights’.  Though of 
less concern that these issues, voters with a conservative religious position on 
abortion expressed concerns, that the EU Court of Justice could interpret abortion as 
a fundamental right – over-riding Ireland’s defacto legal prohibition on abortion and 
one conservative pro-business group Libertas, argued that Lisbon gave the EU the 
potential authority to require Ireland to raise its low level of corporation tax.   The 
issue of conscription, though hardly featuring during the campaign itself, apart from 
on the websites and leaflets of groups quite marginal to the campaign, was 
highlighted in the research report, as 48% of no voters and remarkably 26% of yes 
voters said the ‘introduction of conscription to a European army’ was ‘included’ in the 
treaty.   
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After the referendum the Irish government opened negotiations with other member 
states and reached agreement that if the Lisbon Treaty was ratified they would alter 
their previous position on the Commission and each member state would retain the 
right to nominate a member of the Commission.  By contrast if Lisbon was not 
ratified, the previous position adopted in the Treaty of Nice, whereby membership 
would be rotated would remain.  Secondly, the European Council agreed a number of 
‘legal declarations’ which stated that nothing in the Treaty would affect the Irish legal 
and constitution restrictions on abortion, and affirmed Ireland’s right to maintain its 
policy of military neutrality.  Economic concerns raised during the campaign were 
addressed in two ways.  Responding to conservative pro-business groups the legal 
declarations stated that nothing in the treaty altered EU competency on taxation 
matters while in response to separate concerns raised by the trade union movement 
and left wing parties about the dominant neo-liberal ethos in EU economic policies, a 
separate solemn declaration on workers rights and social policy asserted that the EU 
was committed to public services and workers rights and also affirmed member state 
competency for the delivery of health and education services. 
The longer pre-publicity for the second referendum, the legal changes and the 
‘restoration’ of each state’s right to nominate a Commission seemed to deal with 
many of the issues at the heart of the first referendum campaign.  In addition of 
course, Ireland entered a severe economic recession leading to a severe deficit in 
public finances.  In combination these events were sufficient to decisively swing the 
result.  In the second referenda, the ‘yes’ vote of 67% was the highest in any EU 
related referenda since the Maastricht Treaty.  There remains however a resilient 
33% of the population who continue to oppose recent developments in EU 
integration.  These voters have diverse and in many cases conflicting concerns.  
They include a left-wing critique from Sinn Féin and the Socialist Party and from 
some supporters of the Irish Labour Party, (though not any of the Labour Party 
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leadership) which opposes the neo-liberal focus of EU economic policy and the 
development of European Security and Defence Policy; there is a nationalist 
discourse from Sinn Féin, but also parts of the governing Fianna Fáil party 
expressing concern at loss of sovereignty and political control; there is finally a 
conservative Catholic position which opposes the EU focus on fundamental rights 
and expresses a fear that an EU wide rights regime would be utilised to advance a 
secular and liberal agenda  on issues such as abortion rights.  None of these groups 
however are likely to have a significant influence on Irish foreign policy, which 
remains strongly committed to EU integration, while defending member state 
competency on issues such as corporate taxes. 
     
Ireland and the United Nations 
 
The 1996 Irish White Paper on Foreign policy sets out four priority areas of interest 
for Irish foreign policy within the United Nations – peacekeeping, disarmament, 
human rights and development.3  Each of these issues is discussed in turn, followed 
by a short discussion of Ireland’s role of the Security Council, during its most recent 
term in 2001 and 2002. 
 
 
Peacekeeping  
Ireland has been a very significant contributor to UN peace support operations – in 
particular peacekeeping.  Indeed given the comparatively small size of the Irish army 
that contribution has been remarkable.  Recent international commitments have 
typically seen almost 800 Irish troops abroad at any one time, out of an army of 8500. 
That is a high proportion by current international standards – where having less than 
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 For up to date official positions see policies link on Dept of Foreign Affairs website 
www.dfa.ie  
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5% of the military on active international duty is more typical.  Ireland has in recent 
years deployed significant numbers on UN missions in Africa, including UN missions 
in Ethiopia / Eritrea, Liberia and Chad –where the UN has had great difficulty getting 
commitments from developed states to provide troops, despite clear needs.4   
 
Irish opponents of ESDP have argued that pressure from EU partners to build 
effective EU military capacity will lead inevitably to a reduced availability of Irish 
soldiers for UN duty.  Given the reluctance of most EU states to serve under UN 
command or to serve in Africa this might lead to a significant change in Irish practice.  
On the other hand it is possible that if the EU were to develop a military capacity of 
its own to carry out significant peace support operations then states not currently 
participating at significant levels in UN peacekeeping might then feel more pressure 
to participate (and pay for) an EU led operation in response to a UN request.   
Ireland wishes to be active in ESDP and played an important role in the EUFOR 
mission military in Chad/CAR, providing the mission commander (General Pat Nash) 
and 400 troops.  The EU does not possess the UN’s legitimacy and Irish law requires 
a UN mandate to allow deployment of troops.  Even so, it is recognised that it is a 
real challenge for the EU to build the level of acceptability that the UN possesses. 
The state remains committed to providing peacekeepers for UN missions and stayed 
in Chad when the UN took over the EU mission. 
 
Disarmament 
Since joining the United Nations Ireland has engaged in regular diplomatic initiatives 
on disarmament, was a leading promoter of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), 
and continues to be active in initiatives to revive its influence.  However, this is clearly 
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an area where international progress has been very limited and where a small non-
nuclear state has little leverage.  On wider disarmament issues, Ireland was an early 
supporter of the anti-landmines campaign and signed and ratified the convention on 
the first day.    Ireland also hosted the summit in May 2008 which adopted the 
convention on Cluster Munitions and was among its strong supporters.   
 
 
Development and the role of the UN in generating consensus  
The UN plays a key role in building an international consensus on development and 
utilises its position to seek to secure stronger commitments from the developed world 
on aid, trade and debt relief.  Both in terms of its aid spending and the wider context 
of its overall policy on aid, Ireland has been closely tied to the UN system.  While the 
bulk of Irish development aid goes to its priority programme countries, primarily in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and to supporting the work of Irish development NGOs, in recent 
years the size of the contributions to the UN agencies has grown and is now larger 
than the contribution to the EU development programme, with UNDP, UNICEF and 
UNHCR being the largest recipients. 
In addition to increasing its development aid budget, Ireland has been a strong 
supporter of the UN’s single most important initiative in the development arena - the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000.  While the Goals have been 
criticised for their limited vision, the initial success of the MDGs was their capacity to 
re-engage the governments of the Global North on issues of development.  In this 
regard the strength of the United Nations is clear, as even though there was nothing 
new in policy terms in the MDGs they could be presented as a legitimate, universal 
set of principles around which pressure for reform could be build.  While ultimately 
even the limited goals of the MDGs will not be met, it was a serious attempt by the 
UN at mobilisation and was not surpassed by any other initiative.  The MDGs and 
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their call for increased development aid was supported by the Irish Government at 
the UN Summit in 2000.  The Taoiseach made Ireland’s first public commitment to 
reach the UN target for development aid, of 0.7% of GNP, by 2007.  Ireland has 
subsequently altered its position and while still committed in policy terms to reaching 
the 0.7% target by 2012, recent cuts of over 22% in the aid budget means that this 
target is unlikely to be met.  
 
Human Rights and the weakness of the UN system 
Irish foreign policy regularly asserts a commitment to human rights as one of its key 
priorities for working within the UN system.  However, there are well documented 
weaknesses in the UN Commission for Human Rights and one of Kofi Annan’s 
harshest criticisms of any UN body was reserved for the Commission in his 2005 
report In Larger Freedom.   In this regard Ireland welcomed the creation of a 
separate Human Rights Council to replace the Commission at the 2005 Summit, 
although the degree of change hoped for has yet to materialise. 
 
Ireland sought to mobilise its own efforts on human rights by the creation of a Human 
Rights Unit within the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1996.  Ireland’s profile was 
heightened the following year when President of Ireland Mary Robinson became UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (stepping down early to take the post).  
Ireland’s activism was also indicated by the state’s election to the UN Commission on 
Human Rights for the period 1997-99 and 2003-5, and its election to chair the 
Commission session in Geneva in 1999.  In 2003 Irish Judge Maureen Harding Clark 
was elected as a judge of the International Criminal Court (ICC), securing 65 out of 
83 votes and jointly topping the poll.  
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Ireland also used its term on the security council in 2001-2 to promote human rights 
when diplomats made a number of interventions, and while the current international 
climate with its focus on countering international terrorism has narrowed the focus for 
human rights work, Ireland continues to see the UN as the primary forum for 
promoting human rights. 
 
 
Ireland’s record on the UN Security Council 
Ireland’s election to the UN Security Council for the 2001-2 term, was itself a strong 
vindication of Ireland’s profile within the UN – as states are elected by the entire UN 
membership.  Ireland was not initially regarded as a strong candidate, lacking the 
diplomatic and economic strengths of its electoral rivals - Norway and Italy.  The 
relative ease of the victory – 130 votes on the first round - was a result of Ireland’s 
support for the UN and its positive image on issues such as development and 
peacekeeping.  The term would however test Irish positions in many areas, most 
notably on Iraq, Palestine and the ICC, where Ireland’s traditional foreign policy 
values would place the state in direct opposition to the USA and raise again the 
tensions between values and economic interests.5   
 
The issue of Iraq dominated the council during Ireland’s term. Initially the focus was 
on the impact of the sanctions regime, which had been in place since the 1991 Gulf 
War, and Ireland, in opposition to the US and UK, supported reform of the system to 
ensure a better flow of civilian goods into Iraq.  After mid-2002, as the US moved 
towards invasion, debates focused on Iraq’s alleged programme of weapons of mass 
destruction.  In its contribution on the unanimous adoption of resolution 1441 in 
November 2002, Ireland explicitly stated that it was for the Security Council to decide 
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 For a full analysis with references to sources see Doyle, John. “Irish diplomacy on the UN 
Security Council 2001-2: foreign policy-making in the light of day”. Irish Studies in 
International Affairs, 15: 73-102 (2004). 
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if Iraq committed a ‘material breach’ of its obligations, and that only the Council could 
then decide what action should ensue.  Until the end of its term Ireland continued to 
support the weapons inspection regime and opposed a unilateral attack on Iraq.  
After leaving the Security Council, however the Irish government, unlike France and 
Germany, took a muted and more neutral stance on the war, avoiding clear public 
positions.  US planes transporting troops to Iraq were allowed to refuel in Ireland but 
the government did not actively support the war and continued to express a 
preference for a UN mandated solution. 
 
Irish foreign policy has traditionally supported the creation of a Palestinian state, and 
this was reflected on the Security Council, in the face of US opposition.  In December 
2001 Ireland supported a draft resolution on Palestine, vetoed by the USA, which 
was promoted by the Arab states.  Again in late 2002, following the killing of UN 
employees by Israeli forces, the US vetoed a draft resolution condemning the killing, 
which had been supported by Ireland.   
 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) generated a real crisis on 
the Council, as the US planned to veto the annual renewals of UN peace-keeping 
operations in order to pressurise the Council to agree to an exemption for US citizens 
from the ICC’s mandate. At the open meeting of the Council on 10 July, Ireland had 
said that the US position was ‘not well founded’, that Ireland could not agree to the 
mechanism that the US sought.  Ireland and Mexico were the last two countries to 
agree to support the resolution, and did so only after he became clear it would pass 
in any case.   
 
Irish diplomats displayed a consistent support for multilateralism, for the UN system 
and for a humanitarian and human-rights based approach to international relations 
on the UNSC.  Votes on Palestine and the ICC and other issues such as Western 
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Sahara were cast in the face of strong US pressure. However, Ireland’s term ended 
just before the US decision to invade Iraq became irreversible. If Ireland had been on 
the Council at the time of the invasion, it would have found itself under much more 
pressure to conform to the US position on that decision than on any other issue with 
which the Council had dealt over the previous two years.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Following two decades of referenda on EU reform treaties, Irish policy (like the EU 
itself) is probably entering a period of stability.  While there remains a significant 
minority with varied critiques of the nature of EU integration the size of the majority in 
the second Lisbon referendum means there is limited pressure on the Irish 
government to take any further initiatives on the issues raised by Lisbon’s opponents.  
Within the UN, Irish support for UN peacekeeping is likely to continue given its 
popularity domestically and its high profile.  Activity on human rights, disarmament, 
UN reform will continue as they have high level institutional support and involve 
limited political or financial costs.  Development policy on the other hand – both UN 
based and bilateral – might have been assumed to enjoy a similar political support 
but the failure of development support groups to prevent cuts of over 22% in the 
budget and the effective abandonment of the 0.7% goal have seriously damaged 
Ireland’s reputation in this area.   
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